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Abstract
Unless free international lending/borrowing is allowed, domestic sav-
ing equals domestic investment and hence saving and investment taxes
have the identical effect, as is the case in a closed-economy context.
However, if it is allowed, households can accumulate foreign assets be-
sides domestic capital and hence saving and investment are separated,
causing the two taxes to have different effects. Using a two-sector
growth model, we show that the two taxes generate completely differ-
ent effects on industrial structure. The investment tax always shrinks
the capital-intensive sector whereas the saving tax may well expand
it.
Keywords: saving tax, investment tax, two-sector growth model,
industrial structure, financial asset trade
JEL Classification Numbers: F41, E62
∗The authors would like to thank Makoto Mori, Yoshihiko Seoka and seminar par-
ticipants at Osaka University of Economics for their helpful comments and suggestions.
This research is financially supported by the 21st Century COE programs, Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.
†Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, 6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki,
Osaka 567-0047, Japan. E-mail: ono@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp. Tel: +81-6-6879-8578.
‡Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Yoshida, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501,
Japan. E-mail: shibata@kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp. Tel: +81-75-753-7126.
1 Introduction
In a closed-economy context domestic real capital is the only available asset
when people accumulate wealth. Therefore, wealth accumulation (saving)
always equals real capital accumulation (investment) although they are in-
dependently determined by different agents —i.e., the former is decided by
households whereas the latter is by firms. It implies that saving taxation has
the same policy implications as investment taxation.
The same property is valid even in an open economy context unless inter-
national asset trade is allowed. In this case a country’s current account has to
be always balanced, and hence saving equals investment in the country. This
is actually the case in most open-economy two-sector growth models such
as Oniki and Uzawa (1965), Stiglitz (1970), Manning (1981), Chen (1992),
Manning, Markusen andMelvin (1992), Mountford (1999) and Brecher, Chen
and Choudhri (2002).1
If free international asset trade is allowed, however, saving is separated
from investment since people can accumulate foreign asset along with domes-
tic real capital. The gap between saving and investment equals the current
account.2 Therefore, the effect of a saving tax may significantly differ from
that of an investment tax. In fact, we shall show that their effects on in-
dustrial structure can be just opposite to each other. Judging from the
recent expanding trend of international asset trade, it should be important
to analyze the difference in the effects of the two taxes in the presence of
international asset trade.3
In the literature on international taxation two taxation principles are con-
1Exceptions are Fischer and Frenkel (1972), Matsuyama (1988), Ono and Shibata (2005,
2006) and Futagami et al. (2006). They develop open-economy two-sector growth models
with international trade of financial assets.
2Even in this case world saving must equal world investment. This is because a coun-
try’s current account equals the minus of the other country’s current account in a two-
country setting.
3Since the influential work by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) a large body of researchers
have investigated the degree of international capital mobility. Obstfeld and Taylor (2004),
among them, persuasively showed that the degree of capital mobility was high before
World War I, rapidly declined in the Great Depression period, then turned to increase
after World War II and sharply accelerated in the final decades of the 20th century.
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sidered; one is the residence principle and the other is the source principle.4
Under the former principle the home country’s government applies a uniform
tax rate to residents’ income from capital regardless of where the capital is
located. It however imposes no tax on nonresidents’ income from capital
even if it is located in the home country. Under the latter principle a uni-
form tax rate is applied to income from capital installed in the home country
regardless of the residency of the income recipients. These two tax principles
can be regarded as saving and investment taxation respectively, as shown by
Summers (1988) and Giovannini (1990).5
Comparing these two principles in overlapping generations models of a
small open economy, Iwamoto and Shibata (1991) and Bovenberg (1992)
show that a rise in the residence-based tax rate leads the country to a current
account deficit while an increase in the source-based tax rate makes the
country run a current account surplus. Sorensen (1990) and Ihori (1991)
use two-country models with capital mobility and show that a rise in the
residence tax of the home country reduces capital stock in both countries
while a rise in the source tax decreases capital stock in the home country but
increases it in the foreign country. Thus, it is well recognized that the effect
of an investment tax significantly differs from that of a saving tax in various
respects.6
However, these models cannot be used for analyzing industrial structure
since they either employ a one-commodity model or assume that each coun-
try produces only one commodity. Most of the open-economy two-sector
growth models can neither be used for the present analysis since they ignore
international trade in financial assets, causing a saving tax to be equivalent
to an investment tax.
4See Chapter 2 of Frenkel, Razin and Sadka (1991) and Chapter 6 of Turnovsky (1997)
for more detailed explanations on the economic implications of the residence and source
principles. See also Iwamoto and Shibata (1999) for the deviations of the actual tax
systems from the two principles.
5Strictly speaking, the source tax would affect not only investment but also saving
through changes in the wage rate.
6See also Bianconi (1995) and Lejour and Verbon (1998), who analyze the international
spillover effects of both source-based and residence-based taxation in one-commodity Ram-
sey type models.
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To fill this void, we develop a dynamic two-sector model with free in-
ternational asset trade and compare the effects of saving and investment
taxes on industrial structure. It is found that an increase in an investment
tax of a country moves labor from the capital-intensive sector to the labor-
intensive sector in both countries. Particularly the country that imposes
the tax eventually specializes in the labor-intensive sector while the other
country produces both commodities. In contrast, a saving tax of the more
patient country may move labor from the labor-intensive sector to the capital-
intensive sector in both countries. It is indeed the case when the subsistence
demand for the capital-intensive commodity is significantly larger than that
for the other commodity. Moreover, a saving tax of the less patient coun-
try is found to have no effect on specialization patterns. Thus, the effect
on specialization patterns of a saving tax is quite different from that of an
investment tax.
2 The Model
We introduce endogenous capital accumulation into the standard Heckscher-
Ohlin (HO) model. In each of the two countries, h and f , there are two
production sectors 1 and 2. Sector j (j = 1, 2) hires labor and rents capital to
produce commodity j unless it incurs negative profits. The two commodities
are both tradeable whereas the two factors are immobile across countries but
mobile within each country. There is another sector, called sector 3, which
uses commodity 1 to accumulate capital and rents it to the two production
sectors.7 Thus, each country’s capital varies over time.
The population of country i is Li (i = h, f) and each household’s labor
endowment is unity. Households consume both commodities and accumulate
wealth so as to maximize their lifetime utility. The government of country
h imposes investment tax sI (> 0), saving tax (or equivalently asset-holding
tax) sA (> 0) and commodity tax τ on commodity 2 whereas that of country
7Even if we assume that sectors 1 and 2 themselves accumulate capital, we can obtain
essentially the same results as derived below.
3
f imposes no tax, for simplicity.
2.1 Firms
The two countries have the same production functions that satisfy constant
returns to scale:
f1(k
i
1)L
i
1 and f2(k
i
2)L
i
2, i = h, f,
where kij is the capital-labor ratio and L
i
j the labor input of sector j in country
i.8 Given capital rent ri, wage wi and relative price p, where commodity 1 is
taken as the numeraire, each firm in country i maximizes profits and hence,
if country i produces both commodities, ki1 and k
i
2 satisfy
ri = f 01(k
i
1) = pf
0
2(k
i
2), (1)
wi = f1(k
i
1)− f 01(ki1)ki1 = p
£
f2(k
i
2)− f 02(ki2)ki2
¤
. (2)
From these two equations, if both countries are imperfectly specialized, we
have
kh1 = k
f
1 = k1(p), k
0
1(p) =
f2(k2)
f
00
1 (k1)(k2−k1)
,
kh2 = k
f
2 = k2(p), k
0
2(p) =
f1(k1)
p2f
00
2 (k2)(k2−k1)
,
rh = rf = r(p), r0(p) = f2
k2−k1 ,
wh = wf = w(p).
(3)
Since commodity 1 is used for investment as well as consumption, we natu-
rally assume sector 1 to be more capital-intensive than sector 2:
k1(·) > k2(·). (4)
The optimal behavior of sector 3 is formalized to maximize
V i =
Z ∞
0
[ri − (1 + siI)hi]Ki exp(−
Z t
0
Rds)dt s.t.
K˙i
Ki
= g
¡
hi
¢
, (5)
where R is the equity rate of interest, hi is the investment ratio that equals
Ii/Ki, siI is the investment tax, and g(·) is the inverse of the adjustment cost
8The case of asymmetric technologies is examined by Ono and Shibata (2006).
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function of investment that satisfies9
g0 > 0, g00 < 0, g0(0) = 1, g(0) = 0. (6)
Note that investment tax siI can be regarded as a source-based tax, as proven
in Appendix 1. Country f does not impose the investment tax and hence
shI = sI > 0, s
f
I = 0. (7)
Equity rate of interest R is internationally the same under free trade of
international financial assets whereas capital rent ri is not always the same
across countries since real capital is internationally immobile and its rent is
determined in each domestic market.10
As the result of sector 3’s optimal behavior represented by (5), the dy-
namic path of real capital accumulation in country i is determined so that
1 + siI = λ
ig0(hi), (8)
λ˙
i
= [R− {g(hi)− g0(hi)hi}]λi − ri, (9)
for given {R(t)}∞0 and {ri(t)}∞0 , where λi represents the co-state variable of
Ki.
2.2 Households
The government of country h imposes tax sA (> 0) on the household sector’s
asset holding and tax τ on its purchase of commodity 2, and gives lump-sum
transfer z to it while that of country f neither imposes any tax nor gives any
transfer. Under the balanced budget of the government of country h
z = sAa
h + pτCh2 + sIh
hKh, (10)
9Without adjustment costs of investment the dynamic paths of Kh and Kf are not
determined since the indeterminacy problem pointed out by Mundell (1957) arises.
10When one of the two countries specializes in a sector, capital rents rh and rf generally
differ from each other in transitional states, although they eventually converge to the
same level. When both countries are imperfectly specialized, rh and rf take the same
value because of the factor price equalization mechanism, as (3) shows. See also Niehans
(1984, pp.130) for the difference in implication between real capital mobility and financial
asset mobility.
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where Cij is country i’s consumption of commodity j (j = 1, 2) and a
i is
its non-human wealth (= foreign assets + equities) whose interest rate is R.
The flow budget equation of each household is then
a˙h = (R− sA)ah + wh − Ch1 − p(1 + τ)Ch2 + z, (11)
a˙f = Raf + wf − Cf1 − pCf2 . (12)
Note that saving tax sA can be regarded as a residence-based tax, as shown
in Appendix 1.
Without loss of generality, households of country i are assumed to have
the following log-linear instantaneous utility:11
αln(Ci1 − C
i
1) + (1− α)ln(Ci2 − C
i
2),
where C
i
j is the minimum level of commodity j required by each household
of country i to survive.12 This formulation follows recent empirical evidence
that supports the existence of the minimum requirement of consumption.13
Subject to flow budget equation (11) or (12) the representative household of
country i (i = h, f) maximizes
U i =
Z ∞
0
[αln(Ci1 − C
i
1) + (1− α)ln(Ci2 − C
i
2)]e
−ρitdt, (13)
where ρi is country i’s subjective discount rate.
The first-order conditions for optimality are
C˙h1
Ch1 − C
h
1
= R− sA − ρh,
C˙f1
Cf1 − C
f
1
= R− ρf , (14)
11As shown later in Proposition 1, the steady-state relative price takes a unique common
value under all possible specialization patterns. This proposition is derived only from the
properties of subjective discount rates and production functions.
12In order to assure the existence of the equilibrium path, we assume that the initial
levels of capital in the two countries are so large and the subsistence levels are so small that
the worldwide production of each commodity always exceeds the worldwide subsistence
level of it.
13See, for example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), Atkeson and Ogaki (1996), Ogaki
and Atkeson (1997), Ogaki and Zhang (2001) and Zhang and Ogaki (2004). Moreover, the
macroeconomic implications of subsistent consumption are widely examined in the litera-
ture. Using growth models with heterogenous agents, Chatterjee (1994), Chatterjee and
Ravikumar (1999) and Obiols-Homs and Urrutia (2003) study the transitional dynamics
and wealth distribution in the presence of subsistence consumption. Easterly (1994) and
Steger (2000) introduce subsistence consumption into an endogenous growth model.
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Ch1 − C
h
1
Ch2 − C
h
2
= (1 + τ)γp,
Cf1 − C
f
1
Cf2 − C
f
2
= γp, where γ =
α
1− α , (15)
and the transversality condition is
lim
t→∞
qi(t)ai(t) exp(−ρit) = 0, (16)
where qi is the co-state variable of ai. Equations (11) - (16) give the dynamic
paths of consumption and financial asset accumulation for given {R(t)}∞0 ,
{wi(t)}∞0 and {p(t)}∞0 . Note that the path of financial asset ai is determined
as the result of households’ optimal saving behavior while the path of real
capital Ki is determined as the result of sector 3’s optimal investment be-
havior represented by (8) and (9). The two paths generally differ from each
other since households can hold foreign assets as well as domestic equities.
From (14) we obtain
C˙h1
Ch1 − C
h
1
T C˙
f
1
Cf1 − C
f
1
⇐⇒ sA + ρh S ρf . (17)
This implies that sA works as if the subjective discount rate rose by sA
and that the country of which the sum of the subjective discount rate and
the asset-holding tax rate is higher than the other’s gradually decreases its
expenditure share in the world market and eventually consumes only its
subsistence levels of the two commodities while the other country consumes
all the rest.
2.3 Market Equilibrium Conditions
In the factor markets of country i
Ki = ki1L
i
1 + k
i
2L
i
2, (18)
Li1 + L
i
2 = L
i for i = h, f. (19)
Since Ki accumulates following (8) and (9), Lij’s change over time and even-
tually perfect specialization may arise. It is in sharp contrast to the stan-
dard Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model since in the HO model neither Ki nor
7
Lij’s change over time and hence the two countries stay to be imperfectly
specialized.
Since total demand for commodity 1 equals the sum of world consumption
Ch1L
h + Cf1L
f and world investment hhKh + hfKf , its market equilibrium
condition is
Ch1L
h + Cf1L
f + hhKh + hfKf = f1(k
h
1 )L
h
1 + f1(k
f
1 )L
f
1 . (20)
The market equilibrium condition of commodity 2, which is used solely for
consumption, is
C2 (≡ Ch2Lh + Cf2Lf) = f2(kh2 )Lh2 + f2(kf2 )Lf2 . (21)
3 Specialization Patterns
Since there is no investment in the steady state of the present dynamics,
hi = 0, (22)
and then (20) reduces to
C1 (≡ Ch1Lh + Cf1Lf) = f1(kh1 )Lh1 + f1(kf1 )Lf1 . (23)
From (6), (8), (9) and (22),
λh = 1 + sI , (24)
R = rh/(1 + sI) = r
f .
As long as sI 6= 0, the second equation of (24) is inconsistent with the
condition of factor price equalization given by (3). Therefore we obtain14
Proposition 1. As long as a non-zero investment tax-cum-subsidy is im-
posed, at least one country eventually leads to perfect specialization.
14In the presence of an international difference in the relative productivity between
the two sectors, no matter how small the difference is, imperfect specialization of both
countries never obtains. See Baxter (1992) and Ono and Shibata (2006) for details.
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Proposition 1 implies that the case of both countries’ imperfect specializa-
tion, viz. the standard HO world, never arises. Furthermore, in the steady
state real capital stays constant and hence production of each commodity
stays at each steady-state level. Thus, from (14) and (24) we obtain15
R = rh/(1 + sI) = r
f = ρmin ≡ min(sA + ρh, ρf). (25)
Since we consider the case where investment tax sI is positive, from (25) rh >
rf , which causes capital accumulation in country h to be less advantageous
than in country f . Therefore, country h (or f) never specializes in sector
1 (or 2). Only the following three cases are possible, viz. (i) Country h’s
specialization in sector 2 and country f ’s imperfect specialization, (ii) country
h’s specialization in sector 2 and country f ’s specialization in sector 1, and
(iii) country h’s imperfect specialization and country f ’s specialization in
sector 1.16
In the arguments below, for simplicity, we ignore commodity tax τ
τ = 0 (26)
until we examine its effect in section 5. Thus, from (15) and (26), world
demand for each commodity, C1 and C2, has to satisfy
C1 − C1
C2 − C2
= γp, (27)
where Cj ≡ C
h
jL
h + C
f
jL
f .
Using these properties we obtain steady-state conditions for each of the three
cases.
Case (i): Country h’s imperfect specialization and country f ’s per-
fect specialization in sector 1
15The equality between the steady-state interest rate and the subjective discount rate of
the most patient country is shown by Becker (1980), Blanchard and Fischer (1989, pp.69-
70) and Ikeda and Ono (1992) in a multi-country context. The present result is a simple
extention of it to the case with saving and investment taxes and subsistence consumption.
16If sI < 0, there are the following three cases: (i) country h’s perfect specialization in
sector 1 and country f ’s imperfect specialization, (ii) country h’s perfect specialization in
sector 1 and country f ’s perfect specialization in sector 2, and (iii) country h’s imperfect
specialization and country f ’s perfect specialization in sector 2.
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In country h (1) and (2) are valid and hence from (25) p equals ph that
satisfies
(1 + sI)ρmin = f 01(k
h
1 ) = p
hf 02(k
h
2 ),
f1(k
h
1 )− f 01(kh1 )kh1 = ph
£
f2(k
h
2 )− f 02(kh2 )kh2
¤
. (28)
Since country f specializes in sector 1 and rf = ρmin from (25),
Lf1 = L
f , Lf2 = 0,
ρmin = f 01(k
f
1 ). (29)
Therefore, from (18), (19), (21), (23) and (27),
Lh1 = L
h
1-(i) =
γph[f2(kh2 )Lh − C2]− [f1(kf1 )Lf − C1]
f1(kh1 ) + γphf2(kh2 )
,
Lh2 =
f1(k
h
1 )L
h + f1(k
f
1 )L
f − C1 + γphC2
f1(kh1 ) + γphf2(kh2 )
,
Kh = kh1L
h
1 + k
h
2L
h
2 ,
Kf = kf1L
f . (30)
Case (ii): Country h’s perfect specialization in sector 2 and country
f ’s perfect specialization in sector 1
In this case
Lh1 = 0, L
h
2 = L
h,
Lf1 = L
f , Lf2 = 0. (31)
In country h capital rent rh equals the marginal productivity of capital in
sector 2 while in country f capital rent rf equals the marginal productivity
of capital in sector 1. Therefore, from (25) we obtain
(1 + sI)ρmin = psf 02(k
h
2 ),
ρmin = f 01(k
f
1 ), (32)
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where ps is determined so that the production of commodity 1 (which equals
C1) and that of commodity 2 (which equals C2) satisfy (27):
f1(k
f
1 )L
f − C1 = γps[f2(kh2 )Lh − C2]. (33)
From (18) and (31),
Kh = kh2L
h, Kf = kf1L
f . (34)
Case (iii): Country h’s perfect specialization in sector 2 and coun-
try f ’s imperfect specialization
Country f is imperfectly specialized and hence (1) and (2) are valid.
Therefore, from (25) p equals pf that satisfies
ρmin = f 01(k
f
1 ) = p
ff 02(k
f
2 ),
f1(k
f
1 )− f 01(kf1 )kf1 = pf
h
f2(k
f
2 )− f 02(kf2 )kf2
i
. (35)
In country h only sector 2 operates and thus
Lh1 = 0, L
h
2 = L
h,
(1 + sI)ρmin = pff 02(k
h
2 ), (36)
where pf is given by (35). Therefore, from (18), (19), (21), (23) and (27),
Lf1 =
γpf [f2(kh2 )Lh + f2(k
f
2 )L
f − C2] + C1
f1(k
f
1 ) + γpff2(k
f
2 )
,
Lf2 = L
f
2-(iii) =
[f1(k
f
1 )L
f − C1]− γpf [f2(kh2 )Lh − C2]
f1(k
f
1 ) + γpff2(k
f
2 )
,
Kh = kh2L
h,
Kf = kf1L
f
1 + k
f
2L
f
2 . (37)
4 Investment Tax vs. Saving Tax
Using the steady-state conditions for the three cases obtained in the previous
section, we examine the effect of investment tax sI and that of saving tax sA
on specialization patterns.
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4.1 Investment Tax
By comparing Lh1-(i) in (30) with (33), we find that (33) is valid when L
h
1-(i)
equals zero. Also, since (32) in case (ii) is valid if (28) and (29) in case (i)
are valid, we find pf = ps when Lh1-(i) equals zero. Therefore, the two cases
coincide with each other when Lh1-(i) equals zero. Analogously, when L
f
2-(iii)
in (37) equals zero, (33) is valid, implying ph equal to ps, and then cases (ii)
and (iii) coincide with each other. Therefore, if a change in sI makes Lh1-(i)
(or Lf2-(iii)) zero, it changes specialization patterns from case (i) to (ii) (or
from case (iii) to (ii)). We shall below show this property.
From Lh1-(i) in (30) and L
f
2-(iii) in (37), case (i) arises when L
f/Lh is small
enough and case (iii) does when Lf/Lh is large enough. It implies that the
country with a much larger population tends to be imperfectly specialized
and that the other tends to specialize in a sector. It is naturally understood
since a supply shortage of the other commodity occurs if the country with a
much larger population specializes in a sector.17
Now suppose that Lf/Lh is so small that case (i) arises and that the
government of country h raises the investment tax. From (28) and (29), ph,
kh2 and k
f
1 are all independent of L
i’s or γ and satisfy
dph
dsI
< 0,
dkf1
dsI
= 0,
dkh2
dsI
< 0,
which implies that an increase in sI reduces the numerator of Lh1-(i) in (30).
Therefore, if Lh1 is small enough, an increase in sI makes it zero, causing
specialization patterns to move from case (i) to case (ii).
Suppose next that Lf/Lh is so large that case (iii) arises. From (35) and
(36), pf , kh2 and k
f
1 are all independent of L
i’s or γ and satisfy
dpf
dsI
= 0,
dkf1
dsI
= 0,
dkh2
dsI
< 0,
which implies that a decrease in sI reduces the numerator of L
f
2-(iii) given in
(37). Therefore, if Lf2-(iii) is small enough, a decrease in sI makes it zero —i.e.,
an increase in sI moves specialization patterns from case (ii) to case (iii).
17See Ono and Shibata (2006) for this point.
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In sum, an increase in sI varies specialization patterns as stated below.18
Proposition 2. An increase in an investment tax of country h leads the
case of country h’s imperfect specialization and country f ’s specialization in
the capital-intensive sector to the case of country h’s specialization in the
labor-intensive sector and country f ’s specialization in the capital-intensive
sector. A further increase in the tax leads to the case of country h’s perfect
specialization in the labor-intensive sector and country f ’s imperfect special-
ization.
Intuitively, in country h an increase in sI raises capital rent rh (= (1 +
sI)ρmin) and makes the capital-intensive sector less advantageous whereas
in country f capital rent rf remains equal to ρmin. Therefore, if initially
country h is imperfectly specialized and country f specializes in the capital-
intensive sector, country h reduces, and eventually stops, production of the
capital-intensive commodity as sI rises. Then, country h specializes in the
labor-intensive sector while country f does in the capital-intensive sector. A
further increase in sI reduces country h’s capital stock more and decreases
production of the labor-intensive commodity, the only commodity that coun-
try h produces. Therefore, country f starts producing the labor-intensive
commodity as well. Figure 1 depicts a typical case of the investment-tax
effect on specialization patterns.
4.2 Saving Tax
In the case where foreign-asset holding is not allowed, including the closed-
economy case, a saving tax is equivalent to an investment tax since people as
18Dependent upon the values of technological, preference and population parameters,
the changes in specialization patterns mentioned in proposition 2 may not occur even
under a sufficiently large change in the investment tax. For example, if Lf/Lh is very
large, country f cannot perfectly specialize in the capital-intensive sector and hence only
case (iii) is valid. In fact, from (35), (36), and Lf2-(iii) in (37) we find L
f
2-(iii) to stay within
(0, Lf ) for any positive sI . However, we can definitely say that the shifts in specialization
patterns opposite to what proposition 2 states never arise.
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a whole has no other choice than domestic real capital when saving. However,
unless foreign-asset holding is restricted, saving and investment are separated
from each other. Therefore, the effect of a saving tax should differ from that
of an investment tax. This section examines the effect of a saving tax and
compare it with that of an investment tax obtained in the previous section.
Whether the country that imposes saving tax sA is more time-patient or
less results in a quite different effect on production and specialization patterns
of the two countries. It is in sharp contrast to the effect of investment tax sI
summarized by proposition 2, which is independent of which country is more
patient.
First, we analyze the case where the less patient country imposes sA and
obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3. An increase in the less patient country’s saving tax affects
neither specialization patterns nor demand patterns in the steady state.
Proof. Suppose that country h is the less patient country, i.e., sA + ρh > ρf .
Then, an increase in sA does not affect ρmin(= min(sA + ρh, ρf)). Therefore,
the steady-state conditions in the three cases presented in section 3 are all
left unaffected. Q.E.D.
If sA + ρh < ρf and thus country h is more patient than the other, an
increase in its saving tax raises the steady-state world interest rate ρmin(=
sA + ρh) and harms the capital-intensive sector in both countries. In this
case we obtain the following proposition:19
Proposition 4. Suppose that country h imposes an investment tax so that
it never specializes in the capital-intensive sector. Under Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction technology, if the worldwide subsistence level of the labor-intensive
19As mentioned in footnote 18, dependent upon the values of technological, preference
and population parameters, the changes in specialization patterns mentioned in proposi-
tion 4 may not occur even under a sufficiently large change in the investment tax. For
example, if Lf/Lh is very large, country f cannot perfectly specialize in a sector. In fact,
Lf2-(iii) in (37) stays within (0, L
f ) even if sA (and hence ρmin) is very large. However, we
can definitely say that the shifts in specialization patterns opposite to what proposition 4
states never arise.
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commodity is sufficiently small while that of the other commodity is not, an
increase in a saving tax of the more patient country changes the case of
country h’s perfect specialization in the labor-intensive sector and country
f ’s imperfect specialization to the case of country h’s specialization in the
labor-intensive sector and country f ’s specialization in the capital-intensive
sector. A further increase in the tax leads to the case of country h’s imperfect
specialization and country f ’s specialization in the capital-intensive sector.
If the subsistence level of the capital-intensive commodity is sufficiently small
while that of the other commodity is not, an increase in a saving tax of the
more patient country generates just the opposite transition in specialization
patterns. Note that the results hold true regardless of which country is more
patient.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Propositions 2, 3 and 4 show that the effect on specialization patterns of
a saving tax completely differs from that of an investment tax. Particularly
if the subsistence level of the labor-intensive commodity is sufficiently small
while that of the other commodity is not, under Cobb-Douglas production
functions the more patient country’s saving tax generates an effect opposite
to what its investment tax does —i.e., the saving tax moves labor to the
capital-intensive sector and hence changes specialization patterns from case
(iii) to case (ii) and from case (ii) to case (i) whereas an increase in the
investment tax moves labor to the labor-intensive sector and hence changes
specialization patterns from case (i) to case (ii) and from case (ii) to case
(iii). Figure 2 illustrates the saving-tax effect on specialization patterns in
this case.
An investment tax raises the capital rent and makes the capital-intensive
sector less advantageous only in the country that imposes it. Therefore,
changes in specialization patterns are generated by the labor movement from
the capital-intensive sector to the other only in the country. In contrast,
an increase in the more patient country’s saving tax globally raises the cap-
ital rent and makes the capital-intensive sector less advantageous in both
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countries. It also reduces the steady-state level of capital stock. Therefore,
if prices were fixed, labor would move from the capital-intensive sector to
the labor-intensive sector in both countries (the Rybczynski effect). As the
capital-intensive commodity is less produced, however, the price elasticity of
demand for it decreases in the presence of the subsistence level, and thus the
magnitude of the price rise increases, attracting more labor to the capital-
intensive sector. Specialization patterns depend on the relative strength of
the two opposite effects on labor movement.
Particularly if C1 is much larger than C2, demand for the capital-intensive
commodity remains large and hence the rise in its price is so high that the
latter effect dominates the former, causing labor to move from the labor-
intensive sector to the capital-intensive sector. Thus, in the case where
country h specializes in the labor-intensive sector and country f is imper-
fectly specialized, labor moves to the capital-intensive sector in country f
and eventually country f specializes in the capital-intensive sector. Note
that country f has comparative advantage on the capital-intensive sector
when country h imposes an investment tax and thus country f reallocates
labor to the capital-intensive sector before country h does so. Once all la-
bor moves to the capital-intensive sector in country f , a further increase in
the saving tax reduces the country f ’s production of the capital-intensive
commodity beyond worldwide demand for it, and thus country h starts pro-
ducing the capital-intensive commodity, which leads the country to imperfect
specialization.
If C2 is much larger than C1, on the contrary, demand for the labor-
intensive commodity remains large so that the price rise of the capital-
intensive commodity raises demand for the labor-intensive commodity. It
moves labor from the capital-intensive sector to the labor-intensive sector.
Thus, in this case a saving tax changes specialization patterns in the same
direction as an investment tax does.
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5 Commodity Tax
In steady state the representative household of the less patient country con-
sumes the subsistence levels of the two commodities regardless of whether a
commodity tax is imposed or not in the country. Since the tax does not affect
the domestic prices in the other country, there is no international spillover
effect. Thus, a commodity tax imposed by the less patient country generates
no effect.
We next examine the case where the more patient country imposes com-
modity tax τ . Naturally, it will be found that an increase in τ stimulates
production of commodity 1 and harms production of commodity 2 if both
commodities are produced.
Without loss of generality, suppose that country h is more patient and
imposes commodity tax τ on commodity 2. Then, γ in (15) is replaced by
γ(1 + τ), implying that in country h
Ch1 − C
h
1
Ch2 − C
h
2
= γ(1 + τ)p, (38)
while in country f
Cf1 = C
f
1 , C
f
2 = C
f
2 .
Therefore, γ(1 + τ) replaces γ in (30) and (37). All equations that represent
firms’ behavior remain unaffected, implying that kh2 , k
f
1 , k
f
2 and p
f given by
(35) and (36) and kh1 , k
h
2 , k
f
1 and p
h given by (28) and (29) are all unchanged.
Replacing γ by γ(1+τ) in (30) and (37), differentiating them with respect
to τ and applying (21), (23), (29) and (36) to the results yield
dLh1-(i)/dτ =
phγ
£
(C2 − C2)f1(kh1 ) + (C1 − C1)f2(kh2 )
¤£
f1(kh) + γhphf2(kh2 )
¤2 > 0,
dLf2-(iii)/dτ = −
pfγ
h
(C2 − C2)f1(kf1 ) + (C1 − C1)f2(kf2 )
i
[f1(k
f
1 ) + γhpff2(k
f
2 )]
2
< 0.
This implies the following property:
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Proposition 5. Suppose that the more patient country (which we call coun-
try h) imposes an investment tax so that it never specializes in the capital-
intensive sector. An increase in its commodity tax on the labor-intensive
commodity changes the case of country h’s perfect specialization in the labor-
intensive sector and country f ’s imperfect specialization to the case of country
h’s perfect specialization in the labor-intensive sector and country f ’s perfect
specialization in the capital-intensive sector. A further such change eventu-
ally results in country h’s imperfect specialization and country f ’s perfect
specialization in the capital-intensive sector.
6 Conclusions
Unless international asset trade is allowed, saving always has to equal in-
vestment within a country, as in the case of a closed economy. Therefore, a
saving tax has the same effect on each country as an investment tax does,
although households’ saving decisions are determined independently of firms’
investment decisions. Once free international asset trade is allowed, house-
holds have a choice of asset accumulation between real capital and foreign
asset holdings —i.e., domestic saving is used for not only domestic investment
but also foreign asset holdings. Therefore, the effect of a saving tax may
differ from that of an investment tax. This paper shows that the effect of a
saving tax on specialization patterns in fact significantly differs from that of
an investment tax. They can even be opposite to each other.
An investment tax raises the capital rent and reduces capital accumula-
tion only in the country that imposes the tax. It makes the capital-intensive
sector less advantages than the labor-intensive sector. Therefore, possible
specialization patterns are only the following: (i) the country’s imperfect
specialization and the other country’s specialization in the capital-intensive
sector, (ii) the country’s specialization in the labor-intensive sector and the
other’s specialization in the capital-intensive sector, and (iii) the country’s
specialization in the labor-intensive sector and the other’s imperfect special-
ization.
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If the country raises the investment tax in case (i), labor moves from
the capital-intensive sector to the other and eventually makes the country
specialize in the labor-intensive sector, which is case (ii). Since the other
country faces a lower rent of capital, it specializes in the capital-intensive
sector. After the country that imposes the investment tax specializes in the
labor-intensive sector, a further increase in the tax reduces production in the
labor-intensive sector and generates a global shortage of its supply. It leads
the other country to start producing the labor-intensive commodity, which
is case (iii).
A saving tax has a completely different effect from that of an investment
tax. Its effect is equivalent to that of an increase in the subjective discount
rate of the country that imposes the tax. Since the steady-state interest
rate equals the more patient country’s subjective discount rate, a saving
tax of the less patient country has no effect. However, a saving tax of the
more patient country globally raises the capital rent in the two countries and
affects labor allocation between the two sectors. Consequently, specialization
patterns change. We find that the effect on specialization patterns depends
on the subsistence levels of the two commodities and the shapes of production
functions.
For example, suppose that production functions are of the Cobb-Douglas
type and that the subsistence level of the labor-intensive commodity is suffi-
ciently small while that of the other commodity is not. Suppose also that the
more patient country imposes an investment tax and perfectly specializes in
the labor-intensive sector while the other country is imperfectly specialized,
which is case (iii). Then, an increase in a saving tax by the more patient
country leads both countries to perfect specialization, which is case (ii), and
eventually to the country’s imperfect specialization and the other’s special-
ization in the capital-intensive sector, which is case (i). Thus, it generates
just the opposite effect on specialization patterns to what is generated by
an increase in an investment tax. In contrast, if the subsistence level of the
capital-intensive commodity is sufficiently small while that of the other is
not, it generates the same transition in specialization patterns as generated
19
by an increase in an investment tax.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Residence-based and Source-based Taxation
In this appendix we show that the saving and investment taxes formalized
in the text are respectively equivalent to the source-based and residence-based
taxes in the literature on international taxation.
Let us assume that in country f no tax is imposed and the financial
interest rate is R. In country h residence-based tax θh and source-based tax
ηh are imposed and the financial interest rate is Rh. From the no-arbitrage
condition in country h:
(1− θh)R = (1− θh)(1− ηh)RH = (1− θh)(1− ηh)
"
V˙ h +Divh
V h
#
,
where V h and Divh are respectively the firm value of the investment sector
and its dividends:
Divh = [rh(t)− hh(t)]Kh(t), (A1)
we derive
R = (1− ηh)Rh, (A2)
R
1− ηh =
V˙ h +Divh
V h
. (A3)
Note that (A1) also implies the no-arbitrage condition for foreign investors
between the two countries’ financial assets.
From (A1) and (A3), the investment sector’s behavior is formalized to
maximize
V h =
Z ∞
0
[rh(t)− hh(t)]Kh(t) exp
µ
−
Z t
0
R(s)
1− ηhds
¶
dt
s.t.
K˙h(t)
Kh(t)
= g
¡
hh(t)
¢
,
of which the optimal conditions are
1 = λhg0(hh),
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λ˙
h
=
∙
R
1− ηh −
©
g(hh)− g0(hh)hh
ª¸
λh − rh.
In steady state they reduce to
rh =
R
1− ηh .
We find it to be equivalent to (24) by replacing sI by ηh/(1 − ηh) in (24)
—i.e., investment tax sI is equivalent to source-based tax ηh.
In the presence of residence-based tax θh and commodity tax τ the flow
budget constraint of the representative household is
a˙h = (1− θh)Rah + whLh − Ch1 − p(1 + τ)Ch2 + z,
which is equivalent to (11) where sA is replaced by θhR. Thus, saving tax sA
is found to be equivalent to residence-based tax θh.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 4
We prove Proposition 4 by assuming production functions to be of the
following Cobb-Douglas type:
f1(k1) = A(k1)
θ, f2(k2) = B(k2)
ν , (A4)
where A and B are positive constants. Factor-intensity condition (4) reduces
to
θ > ν.
Under production functions (A4) kf1 , k
h
2 and p
h in case (i) are
kf1 =
µ
Aθ
ρmin
¶ 1
1−θ
, kh2 =
µ
Aθ
(1 + sI)ρmin
¶ 1
1−θ
µ
ν
1− ν ·
1− θ
θ
¶
,
ph =
(Aθ)
1−ν
1−θ
Bν[(1 + sI)ρmin]
θ−ν
1−θ
µ
ν
1− ν ·
1− θ
θ
¶1−ν
. (A5)
Substituting (A5) into Lh1-(i) given in (30) gives
Lh1-(i) =
ph[f2(k
h
2 )L
h − C2]
f1(kh1 ) + γphf2(kh2 )
Ã
γ −
Ã
(1 + sI)
θ
1−θ (1− ν)Lf
(1− θ)Lh
!
Φ(ρmin)
!
,
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where
Φ(ρmin) =
(ρmin)
−θ
1−θ − bC1
(ρmin)
−θ
1−θ − (1 + sI)
ν
1−θ (ρmin)
ν−θ
1−θ bC2 ,bC1 = C1
A
1
1−θ θ
θ
1−θLf
, bC2 = C2
B(Aθ)
ν
1−θ ( ν
1−ν · 1−θθ )νLh
.
Differentiating Φ(ρmin) with respect to ρmin yields
Φ0(ρmin) =
ν(ρmin)
ν−θ
1−θ bC2 − (1 + sI) −ν1−θ θ bC1 + (θ − ν) bC1 bC2(ρmin) ν1−θ
(1 + sI)
−ν
1−θ (1− θ)(ρmin) 11−θ
h
(ρmin)
−θ
1−θ − (1 + s) ν1−θ (ρmin) ν−θ1−θ bC2i2 .
Thus, when Lh1-(i) is small enough,
dLh1-(i)
dρmin
( =
dLh1-(i)
dsA
) > 0 if C1 > 0 and C2 = 0,
dLh1-(i)
dρmin
( =
dLh1-(i)
dsA
) < 0 if C1 = 0 and C2 > 0. (A6)
Under (A4) kf1 , k
h
2 and p
f in case (iii) are
kf1 =
µ
Aθ
ρmin
¶ 1
1−θ
, kh2 =
¡
Aθ/ρmin
¢ 1
1−θ
(1 + sI)
1
1−ν
µ
ν
1− ν ·
1− θ
θ
¶
,
pf =
(Aθ)
1−ν
1−θ
Bν(ρmin)
θ−ν
1−θ
µ
ν
1− ν ·
1− θ
θ
¶1−ν
. (A7)
Substituting (A7) into Lf2-(iii) given in (37) gives
Lf2-(iii) =
pf [f2(k
h
2 )L
h − C2]
f1(k
f
1 ) + γpff2(k
f
2 )
ÃÃ
(1 + sI)
ν
1−ν (1− ν)Lf
(1− θ)Lh
!
Ω(ρmin)− γ
!
,
Ω(ρmin) =
(ρmin)
−θ
1−θ − bC1
(ρmin)
−θ
1−θ − (1 + sI)
ν
1−ν (ρmin)
ν−θ
1−θ bC2 .
Differentiating Ω(ρmin) with respect to ρmin yields
Ω0(ρmin) =
ν(ρmin)
ν−θ
1−θ bC2 − (1 + sI) −ν1−ν θ bC1 + (θ − ν) bC1 bC2(ρmin) ν1−θ
(1 + sI)
−ν
1−ν (1− θ)(ρmin) 11−θ
h
(ρmin)
−θ
1−θ − (1 + s) ν1−ν (ρmin)ν−θ1−θ bC2i2 .
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Thus, when Lh1-(i) is small enough,
dLf2-(iii)
dρmin
( =
dLh1-(i)
dsA
) < 0 if C1 > 0 and C2 = 0,
dLf2-(iii)
dρmin
( =
dLh1-(i)
dsA
) > 0 if C1 = 0 and C2 > 0. (A8)
(A6) and (A8) imply the changes in specialization patterns mentioned in
proposition 4.
In the above analysis we assume that the country that imposes investment
tax sI also imposes saving tax sA. However, even if the country that does
not impose an investment tax imposes a saving tax, it raises ρmin in the same
way as long as the country is more patient. Thus, as long as the more patient
country imposes a saving tax, all of the above results hold true regardless of
which country is more patient.
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